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DAVID COLE
HANGING WITH THE WRONG CROWD:
OF GANGS, TERRORISTS, AND THE
RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
"History should teach us ... that in times of high emotional
excitement minority parties and groups which advocate ex-
tremely unpopular social or governmental innovations will al-
ways be typed as criminal gangs and attempts will always be
made to drive them out."'
The freedom of association vies with privacy and state sovereign
immunity as one of the most potentially capacious and least textu-
ally based rights that the Supreme Court has ever found in the
Constitution. On the one hand, it is impossible to imagine a demo-
cratic society-much less the First Amendment rights of speech,
assembly, religion, and petition-without a corresponding right of
association, so it is not surprising that the absence of any explicit
mention of association in the Constitution has proven little barrier
to recognition of the right. But, on the other hand, virtually all
conduct is at least potentially associational, presenting serious chal-
lenges to crafting a coherent jurisprudence. As a matter of demo-
cratic theory, the right of association is something we cannot live
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without; but as a matter of social governance, the right, if uncon-
tained, is something we cannot live with.
The Supreme Court has sought to navigate these shoals in re-
cent years by adopting a categorical approach, treating associations
as either protected or unprotected depending on their character.
The approach is founded on the proposition that associational
rights derive from other constitutional rights, and therefore should
be protected only when those other rights are at risk. On this view,
the right of association is protected by the First Amendment when
it serves an "expressive" function, and by the Fifth Amendment's
right of privacy when it is "intimate." Association that is neither
expressive nor intimate, however, is categorically excluded from
constitutional protection.2
Two Supreme Court decisions last term reflect this categorical
approach. In City of Chicago v Morales,3 the Court rejected in a
single sentence a "right of association" challenge to a Chicago loi-
tering ordinance that criminalized public association with gang
members. The Court simply asserted that there is no right of social
association, apparently assuming without discussion that gangs are
neither expressive nor intimate associations. Moreover, the Court
suggested that the real problem with the Chicago ordinance was
that it reached non-gang-members, and suggested that if the ordi-
nance had been exclusively targeted at gang members, it might
have withstood constitutional scrutiny.4 The same term, in Reno v
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,5 the Court dismissed a
First Amendment challenge to selective enforcement of the immi-
gration laws against alleged members of a terrorist organization.
Lower courts had found a First Amendment violation because the
government had selectively targeted eight aliens for deportation
based on their political associations, without regard to whether the
aliens had furthered any illegal conduct of the terrorist group with
which they were allegedly connected. The Supreme Court's ratio-
nale focused on the problems with recognizing any selective en-
forcement defense to deportation, whether the selection were
predicated on politics, race, or religion. But the Court simulta-
2 See Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 617-23 (1984).
S119 S Ct 1849 (1999).
4Id at 1862; id at 1864 (O'Connor concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
'Reno v American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S Ct 936 (1999).
[1999
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neously if cryptically acknowledged that some (unstated) bases for
selection might justify a selective enforcement defense, while as-
serting without explanation that selection based on membership in
a terrorist organization certainly would not.6
The federal government has advanced a related categorical ap-
proach in other associational rights cases, in which it seeks to distin-
guish regulation of association per se from regulation of associational
conduct. The government has argued that a restriction on financial
contributions to a political group or individual should not be viewed
as a direct restraint on association, subject to rigorous scrutiny, but
as regulation of conduct that only incidentally affects the right of asso-
ciation, and therefore subject to relaxed scrutiny under United States
v O'Brien. 7 This term, the Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court
to adopt that view with respect to the regulation of political campaign
contributions.8 The government advances the same contention in
defending the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), which criminalizes material support of the lawfl activities
of "foreign terrorist organizations." Here, too, the government ar-
gues that the law regulates the conduct of material support, not associ-
ation per se, and should therefore be subject only to relaxed scrutiny.9
These developments threaten to erode constitutional protection
of the right of association, and warrant a reconsideration of the
right's purpose in a democratic society. The Court's and the federal
government's categorical approaches to the right of association are
unsatisfactory for three principal reasons. First, they require courts to
engage in incoherent line-drawing. Under these approaches, judges
must askwhether associations are sufficiently "expressive" to warrant
protection, and whether acts of association should be viewed as "asso-
ciation" or "conduct." But most, if not all, association is expressive
to one degree or another, and one cannot distinguish conduct from
association without reducing the right to a meaningless formality.
6 Id at 947.
7391 US 367 (1968).
1 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States in Shrink Missouri Government PAC v Nixon,
No 98-963, 1998 US Briefs (LEXIS) 963, at *25 n 12.
918 USC § 2339A; 8 USC § 1189(a); Humanitarian Law Project, Inc. v Reno, 9 F Supp
2d 1176 (CD Cal 1998) (upholding in part AEDPA provisions making it a crime to provide
humanitarian support to lawful activities of designated "foreign terrorist organizations");
Brief for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants in Humanitarian Law Project, Inc. v Reno, No 98-
56062 (9th Cir pending), at 30-54.
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Second, these categorical approaches cannot explain a central feature
of the right of association-its prohibition on guilt by association.
That principle insists on individual culpability, and in no way turns
on whether the association for which an individual is punished is ex-
pressive or intimate, nor on whether the punishment turns on associa-
tional conduct or association per se.
Finally, the categorical approaches used by the Court and ad-
vanced by the government are insufficiently protective of associa-
tion, which deserves recognition not merely as a derivative right,
but as an independent constitutional right, and which if it is to be
a meaningful right must protect associational conduct as well as
association in the abstract. Association, no less than speech, plays
a central role in both the political process and personal develop-
ment, and deserves protection analogous to, but not limited to,
that afforded speech.
Part I will sketch the current contours of the right of association,
a right limited to "expressive" and "intimate" association, and will
describe the government's attempts to extend this categorical ap-
proach by limiting associational protection still further to member-
ship per se. Part II will argue that the Court's limitation of associa-
tional rights to expressive and intimate associations and the
government's attempt to distinguish association from conduct are
unworkable, inconsistent with the Court's own precedents, and fail
to reflect the normative reasons for protecting the right of associa-
tion. Part III will offer an alternative framework for addressing the
right of association, borrowing from the Court's jurisprudence
with respect to another potentially limitless but critical constitu-
tional right, the right of symbolic speech. I will argue that the
focus of a jurisprudence of association ought to be on association,
not expression or intimacy, and that it should protect association
in its physical manifestations as well as its abstract essence. The
critical inquiry should not be whether an association is expressive
or intimate, nor whether the individual affected is engaged in con-
duct or pure association, but rather whether the government's
regulation arises from or is targeted at the associational character
of the conduct. Where government seeks to regulate conduct with-
out regard to its associational character, its actions should be sub-
ject to relaxed review, but where government seeks to regulate
conduct because of its associational character, its actions must
satisfy heightened scrutiny. Only that approach, which mirrors the
[1999
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Court's jurisprudence of symbolic expression, does justice to the
freedom of association.
I. CONTOURS OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
The right of association was born in the civil rights move-
ment and crystallized in the crucible of the Cold War. The Court's
first decisions expressly relying on a right of association protected
the NAACP from harassment by southern states by barring com-
pelled disclosure of its membership lists.1° But the right took de-
finitive shape-and certainly played its most important role in
American life to date-in a series of decisions from the 1960s con-
demning a variety of anti-Communist measures for imposing guilt
by association." Since then, the Court has confronted assertions
of the right in a wide range of settings, from objections to compul-
sory union dues,12 to challenges to campaign finance regulation, 3
to defenses against the application of nondiscrimination provis-
ions. 14 While the Court has never seriously questioned its initial
recognition of a right of association, it has been less than clear
about what the right entails. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has
stated, "We have never had a principled theory of the appropriate
scope of regulation of non-economic association."
1 5
10 See, e.g., NAACP v Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 US 449 (1958); Bates v City of Little
Rock, 361 US 516 (1960). As early as 1937, the Court invalidated the conviction of a man
for participating in a meeting held under Communist Party auspices, but its decision rested
on the right of assembly, not the right of association. De Jonge v Oregon, 299 US 353
(1937). NAACP v Alabama was the first time the Court explicitly relied on the right of
association.
" See United States v Robel, 389 US 258, 262 (1967) (invalidating ban on Communist
Party members working in defense facilities); Keyisbian v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 606
(1967) (invalidating statute barring employment in state university system to Communist
Party members ); Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US 11, 19 (1966) (invalidating oath requiring state
employees not to join Communist Party); Scales v United States, 367 US 203, 221-22 (1961)
(construing Smith Act, which barred membership in organization advocating violent over-
throw of government, to require showing of "specific intent" to further group's illegal
ends); Noto v United States, 367 US 290, 299-300 (1961) (same).
'
2 Abood v Detroit Bd of Educ., 431 US 209 (1977).
" Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1974).
14 Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984); Runyon v McCrary, 427 US 160, 175-
76 (1976) (rejecting private school's assertion that right of association barred application of
42 USC § 1981 to its racially exclusive admission policy); Hisbon v King & Spalding, 467
US 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting law firm's assertion of right of association as defense to Title
VII sex discrimination claim).
I' Frank H. Easterbrook, Implicit and Fcplicit Rigbts of Association, 10 Harv J L & Pub Pol
91, 98 (1987).
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In its most recent applications of the doctrine, the Supreme
Court has sought to limit the right of association categorically,
maintaining that the Constitution protects only expressive and in-
timate association.16 The theory underlying this approach is that
association is only a means of protecting other rights-speech and
privacy-and therefore ought to receive protection only where the
association serves one of those rights.
On this view, expressive association derives its protection from
the First Amendment. Association is not mentioned in the First
Amendment, the Court reasons, but deserves protection (at least
where it is not intimate) because it is a necessary means to the
ends that are expressly mentioned-speech, assembly, petition, and
religion. The right to petition or to assemble, for example, would
be meaningless if one did not have the right to associate with oth-
ers for these ends. The practice of religion is almost always group
based. And without the right to join with others for speech pur-
poses, the right to speak would be largely ineffectual. Because non-
intimate association is but a means to these expressly protected
ends, however, it does not deserve constitutional protection where
it fails to serve those ends.17 Thus, a private St. Patrick's Day pa-
rade organization cannot be required to include a gay and lesbian
contingent in its parade, because the parade is an act of expressive
association whose message would be altered by the compelled in-
clusion of the unwanted group."m But the Jaycees and the Rotary
Club can be required to admit women against their will, because,
the Court concluded, women's admission would not seriously alter
these groups' expressive activities."
Professor Thomas Emerson advocated a similar approach to as-
16 Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609.
'7 Id at 618 ("the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in
those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress
of grievances, and the exercise of religion") (emphasis added); Abood v Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, 431 US 209, 233 (1977) ("Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the
freedom of an individual to association for the purpose of advancing beliefis and ideas is protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.") (emphasis added); Bates v City of Little Rock,
361 US at 522-23 (Constitution protects "freedom of association for the purpose of advancing
ideas and airing grievances") (emphasis added).
"
8 Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 US 557 (1995).
'9 Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609 (1984); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 US 537 (1987); New York State Club Assn, Inc. v City of New
York, 487 US 1 (1988).
[ 1999
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sociation, maintaining, much as he did in the free speech area, that
the Court should draw a sharp line between expression and action,
protecting the former absolutely and the latter only minimally. In
Emerson's view, it is "essential to determine in each [right of asso-
ciation] case-in most cases it is the critical issue-whether the
conduct involved is properly classified as 'expression,' and hence
fully protected, or is classifiable as 'action,' and hence subject to
a greater measure of government regulation."2 On Emerson's
view, as on the Court's view, association deserves First Amend-
ment protection where it is "expressive," but not otherwise.
Under the Court's current jurisprudence, nonexpressive associa-
tion warrants constitutional protection only where it is "intimate,"
and then the source of its protection is not the First Amendment
but the right of privacy. This right protects "highly personal rela-
tionships" and extends to such matters as "marriage; childbirth;
the raising and education of children; and cohabitation with one's
relatives."21 As Kenneth Karst has defined it, "intimate associa-
tion" describes "a close and familiar personal relationship with an-
other that is in some significant way comparable to a marriage or
family relationship."2 Intimate associations, which serve a range
of deep human needs, are an integral part of the private decision
making that the Constitution protects from state interference. The
right of "intimate association," however, is dependent on the asso-
ciation being private and intimate, and therefore does not extend
to large nonintimate associations such as the Jaycees or the Rotary
Club.
Under this approach, which might be called the "labeling" the-
ory of the right of association, an association that is neither inti-
mate nor expressive lacks any constitutional protection. In Dallas
v Stanglin,23 for example, the Court reasoned that social association
in a dance hall was neither intimate nor expressive, and therefore
concluded that its regulation did not implicate the right of associa-
tion. Last term, the Court relied on Stanglin to reject in a single
sentence an associational rights objection to a Chicago ordinance
20 Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale L J 1, 24
(1964).
22 Roberts, 468 US at 618, 619 (internal citations omitted).
22 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L J 624, 629 (1980).
23 490 US 19, 25 (1989).
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that made it a crime to stand in public without an apparent purpose
with a gang member, even though the law selectively imposed
criminal penalties on gang members and those associated with
them.24
Thus, the Court's approach to the right of association is, at least
at first glance, a fairly simple one. Association is protected where
it serves free speech or privacy aims, but not otherwise. The right
of association is, in this view, less a right in itself than an implicit
corollary to other rights, worthy of protection only where those
other rights are at risk.
The federal government's approach to the right of association
builds on the Court's "labeling" theory, but seeks to introduce
still another categorical threshold inquiry. On its view, the right
of association should trigger stringent scrutiny only when a gov-
ernment regulation penalizes association qua association. Thus, a
law that penalized members of disfavored groups would be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. If, by contrast, a law penalizes not mem-
bership per se, but associational conduct, the government main-
tains, the law should trigger only relaxed scrutiny. Thus, a limit
on financial contributions to political candidates, or a prohibition
on material support to a terrorist organization, it has argued,
should not be analyzed as a direct restraint on association trig-
gering strict scrutiny, but as a regulation of conduct that only inci-
dentally affects association, requiring only relaxed review.25 The
campaign finance regulation allows people to associate with the
candidate in ways other than by making financial contributions,
and the material support prohibition permits individuals to join
terrorist organizations, the government argues, and therefore they
should not be viewed as regulations of association, but of particular
forms of conduct.
Borrowing from the Supreme Court's limitation of First
Amendment protection to "expressive association," the govern-
ment argues further that where a law regulates associational con-
duct and does so not to restrict expression, but to serve some other
legitimate end, there is no basis for subjecting it to strict scrutiny.
Campaign finance restrictions are designed to limit corruption,
and the material support provision is designed to limit terrorism,
Z4 Morales, 119 S Ct at 1857.
2s See notes 8 and 9.
[ 1999
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the government maintains. Because these interests are unrelated
to expression, it reasons, the laws should not be subjected to strict
scrutiny. On this view, because nonintimate association is pro-
tected only where it serves expressive purposes, the regulation of
nonintimate associational conduct should not trigger heightened
review unless the regulation is a ruse for controlling or penalizing
speech.
What the government's and the Court's approaches have in
common is a search for limiting categorical principles. The Court's
approach seeks to delimit the range of protected association at the
threshold, by extending protection to association only where it
serves expressive or privacy goals. The government's approach
similarly seeks to treat a wide range of associational action as pre-
sumptively regulable conduct rather than presumptively protected
association. Each of these categorical approaches has the benefit
of limiting an otherwise capacious right. But, as I will argue below,
each approach carves off far more than is warranted by the search
for a limiting principle, and ends by sacrificing valuable associa-
tional rights.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES OF ASSOCIATION
The Court's modern-day limitation of the right of associa-
tion to "expressive" and "intimate" association, and the federal
government's attempt to extend that categorical approach still fur-
ther, fail for three reasons. First, the lines these approaches would
have courts draw are largely unworkable. Second, the restrictive
reading of associational rights that they imply does not account
for a central tenet of the right-namely, the prohibition on guilt
by association. And third, these approaches shortchange associa-
tion by treating it as a merely derivative right, in the face of a
strong normative case for independent constitutional protection,
grounded in the right of assembly and the structure of the
Constitution.
A. DRAWING UNWORKABLE LINES
There is much to be said for adopting categorical approaches
to constitutional law issues. Bright lines are easier to administer
and enforce, and can give much needed breathing room to other-
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wise delicate constitutional freedoms. Nowhere is this more im-
portant than in the area of political rights-the right to speak and
associate with whom one pleases-because the chilling effect of
uncertainty is so powerful there.26 Accordingly, the Court has
sought to establish bright-line rules to govern many speech issues,
including the advocacy of illegal conduct,27 sexual speech,28 and li-
bel. 9 But if a bright-line rule is to be effective, it must both pose
a workable set of questions and carefully track the normative values
of the right it is designed to protect. The Court's "labeling" ap-
proach to association-protecting only expressive and intimate as-
sociation-and the government's extension of that approach fail
both requirements. In this section, I will address whether these
"labeling" approaches are administrable. In the next two sections,
I will argue that even if the rules were workable, they do not serve
the values underlying the right of association.
The Court's current approach to association establishes an inco-
herent inquiry. Asking whether association is expressive, and there-
fore deserving of First Amendment protection, is akin to asking
whether a given action should be treated as "conduct" or "expres-
sion," an approach long rejected in free speech jurisprudence. Nei-
ther conduct nor association is usefully divided into "expressive"
and "nonexpressive" categories. All association, like all conduct, is
at least potentially expressive." At a minimum, the act of associat-
ing with a group expresses something about one's relationship to
other members of the group. In most instances, it will also express
something about one's values and self-image. Even a purely social
association-joining a bridge club, for example, or choosing which
bar or dance club to frequent-is expressive of one's interests, likes
26 NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 433 (1963) (because First Amendment "freedoms are
delicate and vulnerable," and "need breathing space to survive, government may regulate
in the area only with narrow specificity"); Reno v American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S Ct
2329, 2344-45 (1997).
27 Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969).
"
8Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973).
29 New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).
0 Kenneth Karst has argued that:
[a]lmost everything we do is expressive in one way or another, and thus to say
that the First Amendment is a generalized presumptive guarantee of liberty to do
anything that has expressive aspects would be much like saying that the constitu-
tional right of privacy guarantees "the right to be let alone." The First Amend-
ment would, in short, be stretched to cover all our constitutional freedoms.
Kenneth Karst, 89 Yale L J at 654 (cited in note 22).
[1999
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and dislikes, and character. In a social world, we are defined, and
we define ourselves, by the relationships we have with others, from
the most intimate to the most public.
By expressive association, the Court seems to mean an associa-
tion whose purpose is to express a point of view or idea. Thus,
the ACLU is an expressive association because its very purpose is
to gather like-minded people together to express their common
views about the importance of protecting civil liberties. The local
dance hall obviously has no such advocacy purpose. But it is not
clear why choosing to go to the local dance hall is less expressive
for the individual who makes that choice than choosing to go to
an ACLU meeting is for an ACLU member. The dancer may well
be expressing the view that companionship, camaraderie, drinking
beer with friends, and physical expression are more important than
defending individual liberties, for example.
In any event, if there is such a thing as nonexpressive association,
it is far from clear how courts are to go about distinguishing it
from expressive association. The question whether an association
is expressive might turn either on the individual's subjective expe-
rience or on an objective assessment of the association from the
standpoint of the reasonable observer. If the inquiry is subjective,
wherever it matters individuals will likely claim that their associa-
tion is expressive. Can courts realistically reject an individual's
claim that she experienced her act of association as expressive?
An objective test fares little better. From an objective stand-
point, all associations are expressive, even if they are not intended
to express a particular point of view. All acts of association inevita-
bly communicate something about the interests, character, or likes
and dislikes of the actor. Even secret societies, which if truly secret
do not communicate anything to the outside world, are expressive
vis-a-vis other members of the secret society, and may well serve
an expressive purpose for the individual. Thus, it makes little sense
to ask whether a given association is "expressive," because in some
sense all probably are.
At first blush there is undoubtedly a commonsense difference
between the ACLU on the one hand and Standard Oil or the Ma-
fia on the other. The ACLU's purpose is almost exclusively expres-
sive, while the principal purpose of Standard Oil or the Mafia is
to make as much money as possible, through licit and/or illicit
means. But for many if not most of those who associate with Stan-
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dard Oil or the Mafia, their association is nonetheless expressive
in some way of who they are and what they believe, just as are
their associations with family, church, friends, and neighbors. Even
business associations provide a sense of identity and meaning to
the lives of those who choose to associate themselves with them.
And if the line between the ACLU and Standard Oil seems clear,
how should we characterize the New York Times, Working Assets,
or Benneton, for-profit businesses that seek to maximize profits
but whose purpose includes the expression of certain points of
view?
The Court's other threshold inquiry asks whether an association
is sufficiently "intimate" to warrant protection of the Due Process
Clause. Here again, the lines are extremely difficult to draw. What
gives a heterosexual couple a right of intimate association but not
a homosexual couple, for example? Here the threshold inquiry is
identical to the question of whether there is a substantive right.
This category, however, is less susceptible to the critique that it
is incoherent in all settings. It is relatively noncontroversial, for
example, to claim that joining the Rotary Club is not an act of
"intimate" association. While the location of the line between "in-
timate" and "nonintimate" can never be precise, it at least operates
as a rough principle of exclusion. The problem with the limitation
to "intimate" association is less its manageability than its norma-
tive justification, a point to which I turn in the following sections.
The government's proposal that the Court distinguish regula-
tion of mere association from regulation of associational conduct
is also incoherent. The government's suggestions would resurrect
in the jurisprudence of association the approach Justice Black
sought to take with respect to speech. Justice Black believed that
speech should be protected absolutely, but in order to render this
principle acceptable he drew a sharp distinction between "speech"
and "action."31 Professor Thomas Emerson advocated a variant of
that approach,32 but no one else on the Court has ever been con-
vinced, and for good reason. The attempt to distinguish speech
from action is futile. As Louis Henkin wrote, "Speech is conduct,
"' See, e.g., Konigsberg v State Bar, 366 US 36, 60-76 (1961) (Black dissenting); Barenblatt
v United States, 360 US 109, 134, 140-53 (1958) (Black dissenting); Hugo Black, The Bill
of Rights, 35 NYU L Rev 865, 874-81 (1960).
32 Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 8-9 (1970).
[1999
HeinOnline -- 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 214 1999
HANGING WITH THE WRONG CROWD 215
and actions speak. There is nothing intrinsically sacred about wag-
ging the tongue or wielding a pen; there is nothing intrinsically
more sacred about words than other symbols."33 Similarly, John
Hart Ely has pointed out that the inquiry is incoherent because
expressive conduct is simultaneously 100 percent conduct and 100
percent expressive. 34
The same is true of association. All association takes the form
of conduct, even if the conduct is simply showing up at a meeting,
obtaining a membership card, paying dues, signing onto a mailing
list, or clicking a mouse. One cannot associate with others without
taking action. There is no association without conduct. Drawing
a distinction between pure association and conduct undertaken for
associative purposes, therefore, is as futile as distinguishing be-
tween speech and conduct.35
B. BEYOND EXPRESSIVE AND INTIMATE ASSOCIATION -GUILT BY
ASSOCIATION
Even if one could overcome the incoherence problems with lim-
iting protection to expressive, intimate, or "pure" association,
these bright-line rules fail the more important test of normative
fit. First, they cannot be squared with the doctrine's bedrock prin-
ciple-namely, that guilt must be personal, and that guilt by asso-
ciation is forbidden.
A simple example illustrates the point. Under modern doctrine,
one has no constitutional right to be a member of a social country
club, because the club would likely be treated as neither expressive
nor intimate, and there is no right of social association.36 Yet a
statute making it a crime to be a member of any country club that
obtains illegal kickbacks from a vendor would plainly be unconsti-
tutional, absent a requirement that the prosecutor prove that the
31 Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 Harv L Rev 63, 79-80 (1968).
34John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Rules of Categorization and Balancing
in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv L Rev 1482, 1494-96 (1975).
31 This is not to suggest that no distinctions can be made between regulation of the
associational and the nonassociational aspects of conduct. As I will maintain later, courts
can and should ask whether the government's regulation of conduct derives from the associ-
ational character of the conduct, or derives from an interest in regulating the conduct irre-
spective of its associational character. But that is very different from asking whether a given
action is conduct or association, when it will almost always assuredly be both.
36 Dallas v Stanglin, 490 US 19, 25 (1989); City of Chicago v Morales, 119 S Ct at 1857.
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individual member specifically intended to further the club's illegal
conduct. Such a statute would violate the right of association in
the most direct sense of the term, by imposing guilt by association.
Similarly, while it is surely constitutional to criminalize the use of
legitimate business activities as a cover or laundering operation to
further illegal activity, as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) does,37 it would surely be unconstitu-
tional to prohibit mere association with the Mafia.
The principle of individual culpability, captured doctrinally in
the "specific intent" requirement, was developed at a time when
the right of association was most at risk in this country-dur-
ing the McCarthy era, when thousands of Americans were tar-
geted, investigated, blacklisted, harassed, and driven from public
employment or office on charges that they were members of or
fellow travelers with the Communist Party. The Court's early
treatments of anti-Communist initiatives did not demonstrate
much backbone,38 but in time the Court developed a bright-line
rule that effectively halted such efforts: the government may not
impose criminal or civil disabilities on an individual because of his
association with a group that engages in legal as well as illegal
activities unless it proves that he specifically intended to further
the group's illegal ends.
Anti-Communist initiatives almost by definition took the form
of guilt by association: they punished Communist Party members
and supporters because the Communist Party had engaged in ille-
gal activities, regardless of whether the individual had supported
those illegal activities. In a series of cases, the Court consistently
rejected that rationale as a basis for imposing either civil or crimi-
nal disabilities, and instead required a showing of individual spe-
cific intent to further the Party's illegal ends.39
"' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 USC §§ 1961-68.
3 See, e.g., Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951); Communist Party v Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 US 1 (1961).
'9 See United States v Robel, 389 US 258, 262 (1967) (invalidating ban on Communist
Party members working in defense facilities absent showing of "specific intent"); Keyishian
v Board of Regents, 385 US 589, 606 (1967) ("[m]ere knowing membership without a specific
intent to further the unlawful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate
basis" for barring employment in state university system to Communist Party members);
Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US 11, 19 (1966) (invalidating oath requiring state employees not
to join Communist Party because "[a] law which applies to membership without the 'specific
intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected
freedoms"); Scales v United States, 367 US 203, 221-22 (1961) (construing Smith Act, which
[1999
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The Court's most extensive discussion of the principle came in
its first assessment of the Smith Act's membership provisions,
which made it a crime to be a member of the Communist Party. In
Scales v United States, the Court interpreted that statute narrowly in
order to avoid the imposition of guilt by association, which it said
would violate both the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and
the First Amendment. With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the
Court reasoned:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition
of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified
by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to
other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent
overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to
satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4°
The due process principle recognized here is substantive, not
procedural. It forbids the imposition of guilt by association no
matter how clear the notice and no matter how fair the hearing.
The point is that guilt must be "personal" in order to be consistent
with due process. To punish A for the acts of B, without showing
any connection between A and the illegal acts of B other than A's
general connection to B, is fundamentally unfair. It is to punish a
moral innocent. The "specific intent" requirement that the Court
read into the Smith Act, and which it has subsequently held must
be satisfied whenever the government seeks to penalize an individ-
ual for the acts of his associates, responds to the substantive due
process problem by tying the imposition of guilt to an individually
culpable act.
The guilt-by-association principle, and its doctrinal corollary,
the requirement of "specific intent," also rest on the First Amend-
ment. The Court in Scales noted that "[i]f there were a similar
barred membership in organization advocating violent overthrow of government, to require
showing of "specific intent"); Noto v United States, 367 US 290, 299-300 (1961) (First
Amendment bars punishment of "one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of [the Commu-
nist Party], but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence").
4o Scales, 367 US at 224-25: Long before Scales, Justice Murphy made the same point,
concurring in Bridges v Wixon, 326 US 135, 163 (1945):
The doctrine of personal guilt is one of the most fundamental principles of our
jurisprudence. It partakes of the very essence of the concept of freedom and due
process of law .... It prevents the persecution of the innocent for the beliefs and
actions of others.
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blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal
and illegal aims, there would indeed be a real danger that legiti-
mate political expression or association would be impaired. 41
Thus, in order to save the Smith Act, the Court interpreted it to
require a showing of specific intent to further the illegal ends of
the Communist Party.42 When interpreted to require "clear proof
that a defendant 'specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of
the organization] by resort to violence,'" the Court reasoned, the
statute did not unnecessarily infringe on lawful associational
activity.4
3
Significantly, the Court in the Communist Party cases never
questioned Congress's findings that the Party was engaged in ille-
gal activity, including terrorism and espionage, toward the end of
overthrowing the United States by force and violence. Nor did the
Court ever question that protecting the nation against such threats
was a compelling interest. But even accepting that government in-
terest, the Court insisted that "[a] law which applies without the
'specific intent' to further the illegal aims of the organization in-
fringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms" and relies on "'guilt
by association,' which has no place here.' ' 44 Under the First
Amendment, then, the "specific intent" standard is necessary to
tailor the government's regulation to the harms it may legitimately
regulate and to minimize the infringement of lawful association.
It is, in effect, the result of the application of strict scrutiny to a
regulation of association: it identifies the only narrowly tailored
way to punish individuals for group wrongdoing (essentially by re-
quiring evidence of individual wrongdoing), just as the Brandenburg
test sets forth the narrowly tailored way to respond to advocacy
of illegal conduct.
In the wake of Scales, the Court consistently applied the "specific
intent" standard to a range of anti-Communist statutes, including
many that imposed only a civil disability.45 While the principle of
individual culpability is strongest where criminal sanctions are
sought, it plainly extends to civil disabilities as well. The point is
'' Scales, 367 US at 229.
42 Id at 221-30.
4 Id at 229 (quoting Noto v United States, 367 US at 299).
4Elobrandt v Russell, 384 US 11, 19 (1966).
45 Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L J 842 (1969).
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that individuals should not be sanctioned for the bad acts of others,
but only for their own bad acts. Whether the sanction is criminal
or civil in nature is not determinative.
46
The guilt-by-association principle quite plainly does not turn
on the association being expressive, intimate, or "pure." Its twin
rationales are that guilt must be personal, and that legitimate asso-
ciations should not be sacrificed in the name of deterring illegiti-
mate associations. Both rationales would apply to the hypothetical
country club statute noted above. To punish a member who had
no connection to the illegal kickbacks would be to punish a moral
innocent, and therefore would contravene the due process princi-
ple that guilt must be personal. And to punish a member who had
no intent to further the club's illegal conduct would be to deter
legitimate association. Nor would the analysis be different if the
statute punished the payment of dues to the country club as op-
posed to membership; it would still be imposing a penalty not for
the culpable acts of the individual but for his or her wholly legiti-
mate associational activity. Thus, the guilt-by-association princi-
ple, the cornerstone of the right of association, cannot be squared
with the Court's limitation of the right to expressive and intimate
association, nor with the federal government's suggestion that the
right protects only membership itself.
While today's Court has never explicitly questioned its holdings
in the Communist Party cases, its swift dismissal of the right-of-
association claim in Morales suggests that the Court has lost sight
of this principal feature of the right. The Chicago ordinance at
issue imposed a criminal disability on gang members that did not
apply to other citizens. Other citizens were free to stand on street
" The Court has continued to adhere to the prohibition on guilt by association, and to
extend it to noncriminal settings. In Healy v James, 408 US 169 (1972), the Court held
that a public university could not deny use of meeting rooms to a student group on the
ground that it was affiliated with a national organization, Students for a Democratic Society,
that had engaged in illegal violent activity. The Court stated that "[i]t has been established
that 'guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an individual's association poses
the threat feared by the Government,' is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First
Amendment rights." Id at 186 (quoting United States v Robel, 389 US at 265). Similarly,
in NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, 458 US 886 (1982), the Court held that civil liability
could not constitutionally be imposed on leaders of the NAACP on the ground that a
boycott led by the NAACP had resulted in violence, absent evidence that the leaders spe-
cifically intended the violence. The Court stated that "guilt by association is a philosophy
alien to the traditions of a free society and the First Amendment itself." Id at 932 (internal
citations omitted).
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corners with no apparent purpose to their hearts' content. But
gang members who engaged in the same activity (and those who
did so with them) could be ordered to move on and arrested. The
definition of "gang member," moreover, required no evidence that
an individual had engaged in or sought to further any illegal activ-
ity, but only that the gang engaged in illegal activity.47 The ordi-
nance was a classic instance of guilt by association.
The Court's one-sentence response to the associational claim-
that the right of association does not encompass "social contact
between gang members and others" 4S-misses the point alto-
gether. The associational problem with the Chicago ordinance was
that it hinged criminal disability on gang membership without any
showing that the individual sought to further the gang's illegal ac-
tivities. Such a law might not violate the right of association if the
gang engaged in exclusively illegal activity, but few if any gangs
do, and in any event that was neither an allegation in the case nor
a prerequisite to application of the ordinance.
The Court's failure to recognize the guilt-by-association feature
of the Morales case went even further, as the Court affirmatively
suggested that the ordinance's infirmity might have been cured had
Chicago adopted a more extreme version of guilt by association.
Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority, invalidated as unconsti-
tutionally vague the ordinance's definition of loitering as standing
with "no apparent purpose," but added in dicta that the ordinance
would "possibly" be constitutional "if it only applied to loitering
by persons reasonably believed to be criminal gang members. '49
Justices O'Connor and Breyer, concurring, agreed that "no appar-
"The Chicago ordinance provided in relevant part:
Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to be
a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more
other persons, he shall order all such person to disperse and remove themselves
from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in viola-
tion of this section. Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code §
8-4-015(a), quoted in Morales, 119 S Ct at 1854 n 2.
The ordinance defines "loiter" to mean "to remain in any one place with no apparent
purpose." Id at § (c)(1). And it defines "criminal street gang" to mean any group "having
as one of its substantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enu-
merated in paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity." Id at § (c)(2).
4
1Morales, 119 S Ct at 1857.
49Id at 1862.
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ent purpose" was vague, but twice said that if the law were limited
to gang members, it "would avoid the vagueness problems of the
ordinance as construed by the Illinois Supreme Court." 0
This suggestion is a non sequitur. Limiting the scope of persons
subject to the law would do nothing whatsoever to respond to the
vagueness of the term "no apparent purpose." The term is equally
vague whether it applies to a million citizens or a single citizen.
As Justice Scalia explained:
if "remain[ing] in one place with no apparent purpose" is so
vague as to give the police unbridled discretion in controlling
the conduct of non-gang-members, it surpasses understanding
how it ceases to be so vague when applied to gang members.
Surely gang members cannot be decreed to be outlaws, subject
to the merest whim of the police as the rest of us are not.51
Justice Thomas echoed that critique in a separate dissent.52
That the majority did not even offer a response to Justices Scalia
and Thomas on this point only reveals how blind the majority was
to the guilt-by-association problem. But beyond the logical fallacy
pointed out by the dissenters, the majority had it exactly backward.
Narrowing the ordinance to gang members would make the statute
worse, not better, for it would exacerbate the law's reliance on
guilt by association. The Court's suggestion that what cannot be
done constitutionally to ordinary citizens might be done constitu-
tionally to gang members, simply by virtue of their gang member-
ship, is directly contrary to the lessons of the Court's Communist
Party cases.
The majority was evidently motivated by concern about gangs,
which undeniably pose a serious threat to the health and well-be-
ing of inner-city communities across the country. Gangs engage
in criminal activity, fight over turf, and intimidate law-abiding citi-
zens. They enforce antisocial norms, encouraging youth to engage
in crime. And many young people growing up in poverty-stricken
high-crime neighborhoods report that they feel compelled to join
gangs for protection. Gangs play a particularly destructive role be-
5 Id at 1865 (O'Connor concurring); see also id at 1864.
11 Id at 1879 (Scalia dissenting).
52 Id at 1885 (Thomas dissenting) (challenging logic of suggestion that ordinance might
be cured by limiting it to gang members).
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cause they often provide one of the few sources of peer support
and guidance in communities decimated by poverty and crime.
But it is undoubtedly the rare gang that engages exclusively in
illegal behavior. Gangs also provide social activities and networks
of support to their members. For better or worse, peer groups are
a central part of virtually every young person's upbringing; gangs
are simply one particularly urban and usually lower class form of
peer group. They provide for their members much as fraternities,
sororities, basketball leagues, the Boy Scouts, and the Moose
Lodge do. 3 Some gangs engage in political activity, working for
community development, voter registration, and civil rights.54
Accordingly, for analytical purposes, most gangs are like the
Communist Party-they engage in both legal and illegal activity.
Antigang laws impermissibly impose guilt by association to the ex-
tent that they hinge adverse treatment of individuals (criminal or
civil) on their gang membership, without evidence that the individ-
ual specifically intended to further the illegal ends of the gang.
This becomes clear in the Chicago case if one simply substitutes
Communist Party for gang. If the Chicago ordinance had selec-
tively authorized police to order loitering Communist Party mem-
bers and their associates to move under penalty of arrest, the law's
infirmity on associational grounds would have been self-evident,
and it would certainly have been no response to assert that the
right to social encounters on street corners is not protected by the
First Amendment. There is no need to prove that the "activity"
targeted is constitutionally protected where the law discriminates
on its face on the basis of association. A law that criminalized gum
chewing by Communist Party members would not be saved from
constitutional attack by the fact that the Constitution does not
protect the chewing of gum. There is no constitutional right to
11 Terence R. Boga, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public
Space, 29 Harv CR-CL L Rev 477, 487-88 (1994); Jeffrey J. Mayer, Individual Moral Respon-
sibility and the Criminalization of Youth Gangs, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 943, 949 (1993)
("Gangs are, and always have been, groups of youths formed for many of the same motives
that youths have always organized themselves-friendship and social identity as well as the
pursuit of delinquent or criminal activities"); Felix M. Padilla, The Gang as an American
Enterprise 9-10, 91-117 (1992).
" See, e.g., Don Terry, Chicago Gangs, Extending Turf, Turn to Politics, NY Times (Oct
25, 1993), at A12 (gang involvement with health care, education, voter registration, and
supporting of candidates); Gang Summit Ends with Call for Jobs, LA Times (May 3, 1993),
at Al 3 (noting gang summit policy positions on employment and civil rights); George Papa-
john, Gangs Aren't Rookies in City Politics, Chicago Tribune (March 31, 1995), sec 1 at 1.
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work in defense facilities, yet in United States v Robel5 the Court
recognized that when the government denied the opportunity to
work on the basis of Communist Party membership, without the
requisite showing of specific intent, it violated the right of associa-
tion. Thus, even if there is no right to hang out on a street corner,
a law that selectively bars gang members from hanging out while
permitting all others to do so imposes guilt by association.
The Court's insensitivity to guilt by association is also reflected
in its offhand treatment of the associational claim in Reno v Ameri-
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.56 The lower courts in that case
had found that the government had selectively targeted eight aliens
for deportation on the basis of their alleged political associations
with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a
constituent group within the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The government called the PFLP a "terrorist organization," but
did not dispute that it engaged in a wide range of perfectly legiti-
mate and lawful activity, from the provision of health care and day
care to political and cultural activities. Nor did the government
ever allege that the eight aliens had intended to support any of
the PFLP's unlawful activities. The lower courts enjoined the de-
portations on a showing that the INS had not sought to deport
similarly situated aliens, and had targeted these aliens for deporta-
tion based on their political associations without any evidence of
specific intent to further the PFLP's illegal ends. 7
The Supreme Court's principal holding in American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. involved a jurisdictional issue. It concluded
that a provision of the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996 had effectively stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction to consider the aliens' selective-enforcement claims. It
then confronted the question whether this interpretation raised
constitutional concerns by depriving the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion to hear a constitutional claim. The Court concluded that it
did not, essentially because the Constitution does not recognize
selective enforcement as a defense to deportation. The Court's
analysis studiously avoided discussion of the First Amendment, fo-
5 389 US 258 (1967).
6 119 S Ct 936 (1999).
"American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v Reno, 70 F3d 1045 (9th Cir 1995), 119 F3d
1367 (9th Cir 1998), rev'd, 119 S Ct 936 (1999).
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cusing instead on the problems that any selective-enforcement
claim would present, and thus the decision can be read as having
little or no implications for the doctrinal question of whether
aliens have First Amendment rights.58 But the Court did expressly
leave open the possibility that some "outrageous" grounds for se-
lective deportation might violate the Constitution, while asserting
without explanation that selective deportation for being a "mem-
ber of an organization that supports terrorist activity" was not suf-
ficiently outrageous.59
The fact that the Court felt no need to explain why the grounds
for selection in Reno v American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.
were not outrageous again illustrates its blindness to guilt by asso-
ciation.60 In other contexts, the Court has stated that guilt by asso-
ciation "has no place here"'" and "is a philosophy alien to the
traditions of a free society and the First Amendment itself."62 In-
fringements on the right of association generally trigger as strin-
gent scrutiny as infringements on the freedom of speech or viola-
tions of equal protection. Thus, it is not clear why a selective
deportation motivated by race would be more "outrageous" than
one motivated by association. Nor, if the guilt-by-association prin-
ciple stands, is it clear why selective deportation triggered by asso-
ciation with the Democratic Party would be more "outrageous"
than one motivated by association with the PFLP. Yet the Court
evidently felt the point to be so obvious that it needed no
explanation.
58 See Gerald L. Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment after
Reno v AADC, forthcoming Georgetown Immig L J (2000); David Cole, Damage Control?
A Comment on Professor Neuman's Reading ofReno v AADC, forthcoming Georgetown Immig
L J (2000).
5' 119 S Ct at 946-47.
'Justice Stevens, concurring, implied that the guilt-by-association principle was not trig-
gered here because the government was not "punishing" innocent members, but merely
selecting whom to deport among otherwise deportable aliens. 119 S Ct at 952 (Stevens
concurring in part). But that view requires a rejection of the legion of cases applying the
guilt-by-association principle to the imposition of civil disabilities and civil liabilities. See
notes 45 and 46. If it violates guilt by association to deny a student group access to university
meeting rooms on the basis of their association, surely it violates guilt by association to
target an alien for deportation on that basis. On Justice Stevens's view, it would presumably
be constitutional for the Internal Revenue Service to announce a policy of targeting for
tax fraud investigations and prosecutions members of the Democratic Party, because it
would not be "punishing" innocent members, but only those guilty of tax fraud.
" Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US at 19.
62 NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, 458 US at 932 (internal citations omitted).
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The problem may be that it is always easier to recognize guilt
by association in hindsight. It is no accident that the Court's ap-
proach to anti-Communist laws developed as the Communist
threat waned. Our fears today are directed not at Communists but
at "gangs" and "terrorists." The Court's inability to recognize the
guilt-by-association problem in Morales and American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm. may be attributed to the blinders of today's
hysteria. But it is precisely when those fears are greatest that con-
stitutional protection is most needed.
The Court's early right-of-association decisions make clear that
the constitutional right of association cannot be limited, as the
Court's more recent decisions suggest, to expressive and intimate
association. The right extends to all associations, including the
nonexpressive and nonintimate, at least inasmuch as it forbids the
imposition of disabilities on individuals merely because of their ties
to a group, absent proof of specific intent to further some illegal
activity. The specific intent standard distinguishes individual cul-
pability from guilt by association, and because it serves that inde-
pendent purpose, applies even if the association charged is neither
intimate nor expressive.
C. ASSOCIATION AS AN END, NOT A MEANS-THE RIGHT
TO WEAR A HAT
In addition to ignoring the lessons of its own decisions con-
demning guilt by association, the Court's modern jurisprudence of
association also fails adequately to reflect the normative reasons
for protecting the right of association. It treats the right of associa-
tion as derivative, protected only to the extent that it serves other
constitutional rights. But the constitutional case for protecting as-
sociation extends beyond the right's derivative functions, and sup-
ports protecting association not merely as a means to protecting
other rights, but as an independent right in itself. The guilt-by-
association cases discussed in the preceding section demonstrate
one way in which the right warrants protection independent of
the concern for expression or privacy. But the normative case for
constitutionally protecting association is even stronger, and ulti-
mately justifies an independent jurisprudence of association, mod-
eled on free speech jurisprudence, but not limited to expressive
instances of association.
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First, while the right of association is not literally mentioned in
the Constitution, it nonetheless finds solid textual support in the
First Amendment as the modern-day manifestation of the right of
assembly. One of the Court's early right-of-association cases, Bates
v City of Little Rock,63 treated the rights of assembly and association
interchangeably, albeit without explanation,64 and the Court's
right-of-association cases have relied on De Jonge v Oregon, an
early right-of-assembly case.65 That intuitive connection between
the rights of assembly and association deserves more explicit
recognition.
When the Constitution was drafted, association and assembly
were virtually synonymous. In the absence of modern communica-
tions, it was difficult, if not entirely impossible, to associate effec-
tively without physically assembling. While correspondence by
messenger and primitive mail delivery made association and coor-
dinated action marginally conceivable without physical assembly,
the shortcomings of such avenues in a period without a national
postal service or telephones were self-evident. If one asks why the
Framers protected the right of assembly, the reasons would have
little to do with the physical act of gathering together in a single
place, and everything to do with the significance of coordinated
action to a republican political process. Today we are connected
by telephones, faxes, modems, and the internet, and association
can and more often than not does take place without any physical
"assembly." This is not to denigrate the value of face-to-face en-
counters and public demonstrations and meetings, but simply to
acknowledge that what was sought to be furthered by protecting
assembly was not assembly for its physical sake, but for the associa-
tion and collective action that it made possible. Thus, just as the
63 361 US 516 (1960).
' The Court stated:
Like freedom of speech and a free press, the right of peaceable assembly was
considered by the Framers of our Constitution to lie at the foundation of a govern-
ment based upon the consent of an informed citizenry-a government dedicated
to the establishment of justice and the preservation of liberty. And it is now beyond
dispute that freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing
grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from invasion by the States.
Id at 522 (internal citations omitted).
6 See, e.g., NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, 458 US at 908; NAACP v Alabama, 357 US
at 460.
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Court famously adapted the Fourth Amendment to the modern era
by interpreting it to protect against searches by electronic wiretaps
despite the absence of a physical invasion of property,66 so the First
Amendment "right of assembly" is best understood today as pro-
tecting the right of association irrespective of whether a physical
meeting actually takes place.67
The right of association also finds support in the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution. The centrality of collective action to
a republican government was so accepted by the Framers that the
only objection to including the right to assemble in the First
Amendment was that the right was so obvious that it did not need
to be mentioned. Representative Theodore Sedgwick proposed de-
leting the reference to the right to assemble on the ground that
"it is a self-evident, inalienable right which the people possess; it
is certainly a thing that never would be called in question."68 He
argued that "[i]f people freely converse together, they must assem-
ble for that purpose," and sarcastically likened protecting the right
to assemble to declaring that "a man should have the right to wear
his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when he pleased, and
go to bed when he pleased."69 John Page of Virginia replied, how-
ever, that precisely because the right of assembly was so fundamen-
tal, it needed to be expressly protected: "If the people could be
deprived of the power of assembly under any pretext whatsoever,
they might be deprived of every other privilege contained in the
clause." 7 Sedgwick's motion "lost by a considerable majority. '"71
Thus, everyone agreed on the importance and purpose of the right
of assembly; the only disagreement was whether something so funda-
mental as to be obvious needed to be mentioned in the Bill of Rights.
In its first extensive discussion of the right to assembly, the Su-
6 Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967).
67 As Glenn Abernathy has argued:
Freedom to assemble need not be artificially narrowed to encompass only the
physical assemblage in a park or meeting hall. It can justifiably be extended to
include as well those persons who are joined together through organizational
affiliation.
M. Glenn Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association 173 (2d ed 1981)
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preme Court in effect agreed that the right was so basic that it
did not need to be mentioned in the Constitution. In United States
v Cruikshank, the Court stated that the right of assembly was im-
plicit in the structure of our government, and that the First
Amendment merely confirmed a pre-existing right: "The very idea
of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part
of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to pub-
lic affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." 72 If the right
of assembly is implicit in a republican government, so too is the
right of association, since the very reason assembly was considered
implicit was that it made association possible.
Thus, the right of association finds textual and historical support
in the right of assembly, a right considered so fundamental that
it would find constitutional protection even if never mentioned in
the Bill of Rights, and a right that was protected not for its physical
attributes but because without it collective action would be largely
impossible. The right of association is simply the modern-day
manifestation of the right to assembly.
An independent constitutional right of association also finds
strong normative support. Indeed, all of the arguments tradition-
ally advanced to justify protecting speech also apply to association,
and not only to expressive association. As the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged in Cruikshank, the freedom to associate, no less than
the freedom to speak, is a critical element of a democratic govern-
ment. Just as speech is critical to self-government,73 so is asso-
ciation. Indeed, the central metaphor in Alexander Meildejohn's
famous argument for protecting speech is a town meeting, a simul-
taneous confluence of speech, assembly, and association. There can
be no politics without association. Politics in a democratic society
requires collective action. If the government were free to restrict
association, it could effectively close off the avenues for political
change. As the Supreme Court recognized in De Jonge v Oregon,
72 92 US 542, 552 (1876). The Court elaborated:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes existed long
before the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, it is, and
always has been, none of the attributes of citizenship under a free government.
... It is found wherever civilization exists.
Id at 551.
13 Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government (1948); Alexander
Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Supreme Court Review 245.
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free assembly is critical "in order to maintain the opportunity for
free political discussion, to the end that government may be re-
sponsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may
be obtained by peaceful means." 74
Like the freedom of speech, the freedom of association also per-
forms a checking function on the power of the state.75 Voluntary
associations can and often have become important independent
sources of authority that mediate and limit the effective power of
the state. Indeed, in today's world of "interest group politics," the
state in a very real sense must be responsive to private groups,
rather than vice versa. Our tax code encourages the creation of
such mediating institutions, and these institutions play a very im-
portant role in society. As Arthur Schlesinger has described, "[t]ra-
ditionally, Americans have distrusted collective organization as em-
bodied in government while insisting upon their own untrammeled
right to form voluntary associations. ' 76 It was this feature of associ-
ations as mediating structures of authority that led Alexis de
Tocqueville, the philosophical father of the right of association,
to call association "a necessary guarantee against the tyranny of
the majority. ' 77 Laurence Tribe has similarly warned that "to de-
stroy the authority of intermediate communities and groups ...
destroys the only buffer between the individual and the state.
' 71
A defender of the Court's "labeling" theory of the right of asso-
ciation might respond to the link between association and demo-
cratic self-governance and the checking function of mediating
institutions by maintaining that protecting association when
undertaken for expressive purposes fully serves these normative goals.
And, indeed, the centrality of association to the democratic process
does justify extending heightened protection to association for po-
litical purposes, just as speech doctrine accords extra scrutiny to
regulation of political speech. But even if the link between associa-
tion and the democratic process were the only normative justifica-
74 299 US 353, 364-65 (1876).
" Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 Am Bar Found Res
J 521.
716 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present 23 (1949).
17 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 194-95 (Bradley ed 1948) (cited below
as "Tocqueville").
78 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1313 (2d ed 1988).
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tion for protecting speech and association, and it is not, protection
for association should extend beyond expressive association. First,
it is difficult and perhaps impossible to draw a clear line between
political and nonpolitical association, just as it is difficult to distin-
guish political from nonpolitical speech.7 9 Are fraternities, sorori-
ties, country clubs, or corporations nonpolitical? Many of their
most adamant critics would certainly argue otherwise. Second,
nonpolitical association plays a critical role in making political as-
sociation possible, by forging links that are then used to unite indi-
viduals and groups around issues of governance. Friendships
forged on street corners and golf courses, and in dance halls and
country clubs, are essential to making political association possible.
Social ties often provide the seeds for more overtly political
association.
In addition, as with speech, the reasons for protecting associa-
tion are not limited to its political uses. Choosing with whom to
associate is as central to personal development and self-realization
as are the freedoms of speech and belief."0 We define ourselves in
relation to others, and our associations simultaneously shape and
reflect our sense of self. The freedom to choose one's associates
is therefore fundamental to self-realization. Again, Tocqueville
writes:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting
for himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of
his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them. The
right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalien-
able in its nature as the right of personal liberty."'
On this view, mediating institutions are important not only for
their checking function, but because they foster civic virtue in indi-
7 See Chafee, Book Review, 62 Harv L Rev 891, 899-900 (1949) (arguing that the most
serious weakness in Meiklejohn's defense of political speech is the difficulty of drawing
lines between public and private speech); Harry Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscen-
ity, 1960 Supreme Court Review 1, 15-16 (same).
0 Martin Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 11 (1984) (arguing that protec-
tion of free speech serves "individual self-realization," encompassing both an individual's
development of his or her abilities, and an individual's control over his or her own destiny
by making "life-affecting decisions"). Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression
6 (1970) (speech is necessary to "assuring individual self-fulfillment").
"' Tocqueville at 196.
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viduals.82 Association's role in furthering self-realization, self-ful-
fillment, and civic virtue is not limited to expressive or intimate
association. Membership in a country club or sorority, or social
association at the local bar, can and often will play a role in defin-
ing who we are and how we act as much as membership in the
Republican or Communist parties. As Amy Gutmann writes:
Freedom of association is valuable for far more than its instru-
mental relationship to free speech.... Freedom of association
is increasingly essential as a means of engaging in charity, com-
merce, industry, education, health care, residential life, reli-
gious practice, professional life, music and art, and recreation
and sports .... associational freedom is not merely a means
to other valuable ends. It is also valuable for the many qualities
of human life that the diverse activities of association routinely
entail. By associating with one another, we engage in camara-
derie, cooperation, dialogue, deliberation, negotiation, com-
petition, creativity, and the kinds of self-expression and self-
sacrifice that are possible only in association with others. In
addition, we often simply enjoy the company. 3
Finally, like the freedom of speech, the right of association
serves as a safety valve; allowing persons to join with like-minded
others makes it less likely that individuals and groups will go un-
derground and adopt violent means.84 Thus, the Supreme Court
in Dejonge v Oregon,85 unanimously reversing a conviction for par-
ticipation in a Communist Party meeting, stated that "the security
of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government"
lies in preserving the right of assembly "to the end that govern-
ment may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes,
if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means." 6 Again, Tocque-
ville concurs: "In countries where associations are free, secret soci-
12 See, for example, Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and
Steven Tiptson, Habits of the Heart (1984); Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society
and its Rivals (1994); Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone Revisited, 5 Resp Comm 18 (Spring
1995); Michael Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (1996).
83 Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association: An Introductory Essay, in Amy Gutmann, ed,
Freedom of Association 3-4 (1998).
' Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis concurring) ("the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies");
Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 7 (1970) (same).
85 299 US 353 (1937).
I6 d at 364-65.
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eties are unknown. In America there are factions, but no conspirac-
ies. '"87 Here, too, social associations that are not explicitly
expressive in the Court's sense of the term serve an important
function in allowing otherwise alienated persons to find social
support.
Thus, the reasons for protecting association closely parallel
those for protecting free speech. Moreover, they are in no way
dependent upon association as a mere instrument to speech or pri-
vacy, but rest on the independent significance of association as a
mechanism for participating in democratic politics, checking state
power, achieving self-realization, and providing a safety valve for
individuals unhappy with the status quo.8" If these normative claims
are persuasive, the right of association should receive constitutional
protection on its own terms, without a threshold inquiry into
whether it is expressive or intimate.
The Court's efforts to cabin the right of association are under-
standable, even if they are ultimately unsatisfactory. The right of
association is potentially limitless. Virtually everything we do in
society involves some degree of association with someone else.
Only the mythical self-supporting hermit could go through life
without associations with others. At the same time, society must
impose limits on associational freedom: the state enforces obliga-
tions to children and family, imposes restraints on association in
workplace environments and public accommodations, assigns chil-
dren to schools and classrooms, and establishes voting districts, all
of which affect our freedom of association. The very act of govern-
ing a society requires the regulation of individuals' ability to associ-
ate. The Court's efforts to limit the right, then, can be seen as
efforts to avoid constitutionalizing all social regulation. More spe-
cifically, the right of association, and particularly its negative corol-
lary, the right not to associate, have been advanced as objections
to some of the nation's most important goals, in particular,
desegregation.89
But much the same can be said of speech. Like association, ex-
87 Tocqueville at 202-03.
See George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Amy Gutnann, ed, Freedom of Association
35 (1998).
'9 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv L Rev 1
(1959); Robert Bork, Civil Rights-A Challenge, New Republic (Aug 31, 1963).
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pression can be found in virtually everything that a person does,
particularly once it is accepted that conduct can be as expressive
as verbal or written speech. At the same time, for a society to oper-
ate, it must limit speech in many settings-a teacher in a class-
room, a judge in a courtroom, an employer in a workplace, and a
police officer on a street corner all have to exercise the authority
to limit speech, and could not effectively do their jobs without that
power. And the right of free speech, like the right of association,
can be used to hinder important social goals.9°
What is needed is a more coherent approach to association. The
Court's current approach-ignoring guilt by association, treating
association as a second cousin to expression and privacy, and deny-
ing any protection for nonintimate and nonexpressive associa-
tion-fails adequately to reflect the normative reasons for pro-
tecting association under our Constitution, and requires the
drawing of incoherent and unpersuasive lines. In the following sec-
tion, I propose an alternative framework.
Ill. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK
A jurisprudence of association is conceptually challenging
for some of the same reasons that a jurisprudence of "symbolic
speech" is challenging. As we have seen, just as virtually all con-
duct can be expressive, so virtually all conduct can be associational.
Even a murderer may be expressing a point of view or acting in
association with others. Thus, extending constitutional protection
to association or symbolic speech potentially brings all conduct
within the ambit of the First Amendment, much of it unworthy
of protection and obviously subject to regulation. Yet a great deal
of valuable expression takes the form of conduct other than speech,
including music, dance, sculpture, photography, and marching,
and accordingly it is unacceptable to hold that the First Amend-
ment protects only verbal and written speech. Similarly, associa-
tion would be an empty formality without the conduct that brings
people together-meeting, raising funds, engaging in volunteer
work, and the like-and therefore to limit the right of association
to the formal act of joining a group would eviscerate the right.
9 See Charles Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, et al, Words That Wound (1993).
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As I have sought to demonstrate above, the Court's attempt to
limit the scope of the right by protecting association only when
it is expressive or intimate does not solve the problem. Nor does
the federal government's attempt to classify human action as "asso-
ciation" or "conduct," and to treat regulation of anything but
membership per se as a regulation of conduct only indirectly af-
fecting associational rights. The alternative approach I propose
here abjures the unrealistically rigid categories of "expressive,"
"intimate," "conduct," and "association," at least as threshold in-
quiries, and instead maintains that heightened scrutiny should be
triggered whenever the governmental interest in regulating partic-
ular activity arises in some measure from the activity's associational
character. This approach finds strong precedent in the Court's
treatment of symbolic speech, and therefore I will first describe
that jurisprudence.
It is now well accepted that drawing a line between unprotected
conduct and protected speech does not solve the dilemma of how
to provide limited protection to symbolic speech without simulta-
neously constitutionalizing all regulation of human conduct.91
There is no such line, because so much is expressed through con-
duct. Accordingly, in reviewing regulation of symbolic speech, the
Court does not ask whether the activity regulated is speech or con-
duct, but instead focuses on the government's purpose in regulating
the activity.92 The Court has acknowledged that "[t]he Govern-
ment generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct
than it has in restricting the written or spoken word."9 3 This nec-
essarily follows once one admits that virtually all conduct is poten-
tially expressive. The mere fact that the government has prohibited
conduct that is potentially expressive does not trigger heightened
First Amendment scrutiny, because all conduct is potentially ex-
pressive. But where the government regulates conduct because it has
expressive elements, its regulation is subjected to the same scrutiny
accorded the regulation of speech itself. In the latter situation, the
government does not have a "freer hand" in restricting expressive
91 See text at notes 3 1-34.
" Purpose as used here is distinct from motive. It refers to the purposes evident from
the face of the statute and the interests asserted by the government, but does not authorize
an inquiry into the motives of legislators. United States v O'Brien, 391 US 367, 382-84
(1968); John Hart Ely, 88 Harv L Rev at 1496-97 (cited in note 34).
" Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 406 (1989).
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conduct than it does in restricting speech itself; rather, its regula-
tion must satisfy the same scrutiny applied to regulations of pure
speech.
For example, an environmental ordinance banning all public
burning would be subjected to minimal scrutiny, even though it
would have the effect of barring persons from burning flags or
crosses to express their point of view. On the other hand, a law
selectively prohibiting cross-burning or flag-burning is subject to
strict scrutiny, because the governmental purpose in narrowly reg-
ulating such conduct is necessarily to restrict what those types of
burnings express.
This approach is captured in the familiar cases of Texas v John-
son 94 and United States v O'Brien.95 In O'Brien, the Court subjected
a law banning the destruction of draft cards to minimal scrutiny
because it accepted as legitimate the government's objective of pre-
serving all draft cards for purposes of administering the draft. On
its face, the law prohibited the destruction of draft cards irrespec-
tive of any message such destruction might send; it applied to pri-
vate as well as public destruction, for example. The government's
purpose in preserving draft cards, the Court reasoned, would be
undermined whether a draft card was destroyed for expressive or
nonexpressive purposes. Thus, the provision regulated conduct-
draft card destruction-without regard to its communicative ef-
fect, and was subject only to lenient review.96
The Court in O'Brien contrasted the draft card regulation it up-
held to "one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating
conduct arises in some measure because the communication alleg-
edly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful," which
it illustrated with a cite to Stromberg v California.97 In Stromberg,
the Court struck down a ban on flag displays that expressed "oppo-
sition to organized government." By its terms, the law regulated
" 491 US 397.
95 391 US 367 (1968).
6O'Brien states that "a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial govern-
mental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." United States v O'Brien, 391 US at
377. This test sounds more stringent than it really is. In practice, the application of O'Brien
nearly always leads to a decision upholding the statute.
97283 US 359 (1931).
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conduct only when it expressed a particular message. In Texas v
Johnson, the 1989 decision invalidating a Texas flag-burning stat-
ute, the Court reaffirmed that "we have limited the applicability
of O'Brien's relatively lenient standard to those cases in which 'the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression.' -9 The Johnson Court held O'Brien inapplicable because
the government's interest in banning flag-burning could not be
attributed to anything other than the message thought to be com-
municated by flag-burning.
The conclusion that a statute is targeted at the communicative
impact of particular conduct is not necessarily fatal. It simply
means that the law will be treated as a content-based regulation
of speech and subjected to heightened scrutiny. If the government
is able to identify a compelling state interest and means narrowly
tailored to further that end, the regulation will be upheld.99 Indeed,
while the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence generally applies
strict scrutiny to content-based regulation of speech, °° the doc-
trine nonetheless permits a great deal of content-based regulation.
The Court has in many settings applied strict scrutiny in categori-
cal rather than case-by-case fashion, leading to doctrine that does
not consistently use the strict scrutiny rubric but can often be un-
derstood as reflecting the end result of such analysis on a categori-
cal level. Thus, the Court permits the regulation of speech advo-
cating illegal conduct only where the speech is likely and intended
to produce imminent lawless action, a test that identifies a nar-
rowly tailored way to further the state's compelling interest in
forestalling the illegal conduct.' °' Similarly, the "fighting words"
doctrine, which permits the regulation only of direct face-to-face
insults likely to provoke a fight, identifies a narrowly tailored way
to further the government's interest in forestalling violence.0 2
In other areas, such as obscenity, commercial speech, and regu-
98 Texas v Johnson, 491 US at 407 (quoting O'Brien, 391 US at 377).
99 See, e.g., Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191 (1992) (upholding law prohibiting solicitation
of voters within 100 feet of polling place); Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) (upholding
limits on contributions to candidates for federal office).
'0See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US 377, 382 (1992); Boos v Barry, 485 US 312, 321
(1988).
Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444 (1969).
02 Texas v Johnson, 491 US at 409; Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518 (1972); Cohen v Califor-
nia, 403 US 15, 20 (1971).
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lation of cable television, the Court permits regulation of speech
on showings that are less than compelling and through means that
are less than narrowly tailored.1"3 But in all of its modern speech
jurisprudence, the Court's categorical rules are the result of a care-
ful balancing of government interests against private rights, rather
than a simple denial that any speech interests exist. When the
Court, for example, says that obscenity is "unprotected," it does
not mean that obscene speech is not speech, but that as a categorical
matter, the interests in regulating obscene speech outweigh its
value."° Similarly, "fighting words" and "advocacy of imminent
illegal conduct" are sometimes said to be unprotected, but that
conclusion is not the result of a threshold determination that such
expression is not speech, but the end result of a careful balancing
of interests between the freedom of expression and the state's in-
terest in forestalling imminent violence.
A similar inquiry should guide analysis of laws regulating associ-
ation. Instead of attempting to characterize associations as categor-
ically protected (expressive and intimate) or unprotected (noninti-
mate and nonexpressive) as a threshold matter, the Court should
ask instead whether the government's purpose in regulating arises
in some measure from the conduct's associational character, and
whether the regulation is neutral or selective. If the state regulates
conduct generally, the fact that the regulation may incidentally im-
pede some conduct engaged in for associational purposes should
not trigger heightened scrutiny. For example, while a juvenile cur-
few has the effect of impeding associational activity by juveniles
during curfew hours, it is not targeted at association as such, but
at the heightened risk of juvenile crime at night, whether engaged
in individually or in groups. By contrast, a curfew imposed only
on gang members would be targeted at gang membership, an act
of association. Under the latter law, the same conduct-being out
after hours-would be permitted when engaged in by non-gang-
members, but prohibited when engaged in by members. As the
law's trigger would be association, it would properly be reviewed
as a direct regulation of association and "subject to the closest
03 See, e.g., Miller v California, 413 US 15 (1973) (obscenity); Central Hudson Gas v Public
Service Comm'n, 447 US 557 (1980) (commercial speech); Denver Area Educational Telecom-
munications Consortium, Inc. v FCC, 116 S Ct 2374 (1996) (cable television).
" See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 US at 386.
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scrutiny," ' whether or not the gang were found to be "expres-
sive" or "intimate."
On this analysis, the Chicago ordinance in Morales directly in-
fringed First Amendment associational rights. The law regulated
conduct-hanging out in public places without an apparent pur-
pose-only when done in association with gang members. As such,
the governmental interest in regulating "ar[ose] in some measure"
from the associational character of the conduct; in fact, the govern-
ment demonstrated no interest whatsoever in regulating loitering
unless it was done in association with a gang member. As a result,
the ordinance should have been treated as a regulation of associa-
tion. Because it imposed a disability on an act of association with
a gang member without any showing that the individual or the
gang member specifically intended to further any illegal ends of
the gang, the ordinance would not survive such First Amendment
review.16 In this setting, namely, where government seeks to im-
pose a disability on an individual because of his association with
a group, narrow tailoring requires proof of individual specific in-
tent to further the illegal ends of the group.
The above analysis does not compel a case-by-case application
of strict scrutiny. Regulation of association, like regulation of
speech, comes in many forms, some more deserving of skepticism
than others, and the regulation of association may be subject to
categorical rules analogous to those that govern a great deal of
speech regulation. In the speech setting, content-based regulations
are more suspicious than content-neutral regulations, and view-
point-based laws are the most dubious. So in the associational set-
ting, regulations that selectively target particular associations are
more suspicious than laws generally regulating association, particu-
larly when the selectivity is based on the political identity of the
group. Thus, a law generally limiting political campaign contribu-
tions is more problematic than a tax law regulating all gifts across
the board, because the campaign finance law singles out political
association. But a law selectively limiting contributions only to par-
ticular political parties would be even more problematic. The for-
mer campaign regulation would be, in associational terms, analo-
1"NAACP v Alabama, 357 US at 461.
1"Elflbrandt v Russell, 384 US at 19.
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gous to a content-based regulation of speech, while the latter
would be analogous to a viewpoint-based speech restriction.
Similarly, regulation of economic associations, such as corpora-
tions, is properly subject to less stringent scrutiny, much as com-
mercial speech regulation triggers less stringent scrutiny under
speech doctrine. Reasonable regulations of business associations
and corporations designed to deter fraud and to protect consum-
ers, shareholders, and employees would generally be acceptable,
just as reasonable regulations requiring financial disclosures, con-
straining speech in the workplace, and prohibiting deceptive adver-
tising generally pass First Amendment muster without the height-
ened justifications necessary for other sorts of regulation.
Thus, the fact that a law is targeted at association does not nec-
essarily mean that it should be invalidated; like the right of free
speech, the right of association is not absolute. I do not propose
here to identify all of the rationales that might justify infringe-
ments on association. My purpose is more limited-to identify
when associational rights have been infringed, and therefore when
First and Fifth Amendment interests must be weighed in the bal-
ance. My principal claim is that given the centrality of association
to both a democratic system of government and self-realization,
the regulation of association should be subject to scrutiny akin to
that accorded the regulation of speech, without regard to whether
the association is itself expressive or intimate. °7
On the approach I have outlined here, it may be that certain
types of association, like certain types of speech, could be said to
be "unprotected." But as in the speech area, such a categorical
determination would have to be justified by an explicit balancing
of interests after recognizing that associational interests have been
infringed, rather than by a mere assertion that the right of associa-
tion is not implicated ab initio. The Court has unfortunately
07 On this view, constitutional protection is not limited to expressive and intimate associa-
tion, but the presence of an expressive or intimate element in the governmental purpose
may trigger additional constitutional concerns. A regulation that targets association because
of its expressive nature, like a regulation that targets any conduct because of its expressive
nature, would be treated as a regulation of speech, wholly apart from the right of association.
And, similarly, a regulation targeted at intimate association would raise privacy concerns
in addition to associational issues. Thus, the regulation of expressive and intimate associa-
tion may raise additional constitutional objections, but the right of association is implicated
simply by the targeting of association, whether or not the association targeted is expressive
or intimate.
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sought to carve out categories of unprotected association simply
by definitional fiat, without a careful weighing of the state's inter-
ests against associational freedoms. In Dallas v Stanglin, for exam-
ple, the Court upheld a Dallas law limiting entry to certain youth
dance halls to persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen.
The Court reasoned that while dance hall congregations "might
be described as 'associational' in common parlance," they have no
First Amendment protection because "this activity qualifies neither
as a form of 'intimate association' nor as a form of 'expressive asso-
ciation.'"108 To support its conclusion, the Court noted that the
dance halls held as many as 1,000 persons on any given night, that
the youth who came together there were not members of any par-
ticular "organized association," and that the patrons did not "take
positions or public questions.' "'0
If, as I have argued, association should be protected in its own
right, not merely incident to the protection of speech and privacy,
this analysis is wrong.1 ' It would be difficult to imagine a more
concrete example of assembly or association than the decision by
a number of citizens to gather together in a large hall for an eve-
ning. The dance hall is not an assembly for the purpose of peti-
tioning for the redress of grievances, of course, but the Court has
long since rejected such a narrow reading of the right.1 '
This is not to say that the Court should have reached a different
bottom line in Dallas v Stanglin. But a more sound basis for the
result would have been to acknowledge that the regulation in-
fringed on association as such, and then to uphold it as the associa-
tional equivalent of a content-neutral time, place, and manner re-
0 Dallas v Stanglin, 490 US 19, 25 (1989).
'0 Id at 24-25.
10 Indeed, even accepting the Court's limitation of association to intimate and expressive
associations, its reasoning is unpersuasive. Many intimate associations are initiated on the
floors of dance halls. Dance itself is a traditional form of expression. And the exchange of
ideas that takes place in a social setting may be just as valuable from a speech perspective
as that which takes place on the floor of a political convention or academic conference.
' Compare NAACP v Alabama, 357 US at 460-61 ("it is immaterial whether the beliefs
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural
matters") with United States v Cruiksbank, 92 US at 552 (noting that the right of the people
to assemble "for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for
any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the national government, is an
attribute of national citizenship, and as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by,
the United States").
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striction on speech. 112 The Dallas ordinance did not prohibit
association between youth and adults, but merely reserved certain
times and places for youth to associate among themselves, much
as states commonly do in the context of schools, organized youth
activities, and organized adult activities. The city's interest in
maintaining a safe environment for children was indisputably rea-
sonable. The Dallas ordinance did not target any particular organi-
zations, group identities, or ideologies. And it left youth and adults
with plenty of other opportunities to associate with each other.
The Court's simple assertion that "social association" is unpro-
tected, however, does not adequately explain the result, for had
Dallas forbade entry to the dance hall only to adult members of
certain gangs, the law plainly would have violated the right of
association.
The law in Morales could not similarly be viewed as a time,
place, and manner restriction. Most importantly, it was not con-
tent-neutral, for it prohibited loitering with gang members. A law
that forbade loitering by anyone in certain prescribed areas would
be content-neutral, but this law selectively applied only to persons
engaging in particular disfavored associations. Moreover, the ordi-
nance barred loitering in any public place, and accordingly did not
leave open ample alternative channels for association and assembly.
Those who sought to loiter with gang members were effectively
instructed to do so only in private.
The approach urged here might also require a different analysis,
although not necessarily a different result, in the cases challenging
the application of nondiscrimination laws to private groups. In
Roberts v United States Jaycees and its progeny, the Court upheld
the application of nondiscrimination provisions to private men-
only clubs by finding that the expressive rights of members would
not be undermined significantly by a requirement that they accept
women. Applying its threshold analysis, the Court first concluded
that the groups were not intimate because they were too large.
The Court then acknowledged that the groups were expressive,
but determined that the state's mandate that they include women
"2 See, e.g., Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 791 (1989); see also Roberts v United
StatesJaycees, 468 US at 634 (O'Connor concurring) (noting that expressive association may
be subject to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions).
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would not significantly affect their expressive rights. As many com-
mentators have pointed out, this treatment is unsatisfactory; what-
ever else one might say about it, a state law dictating the terms
of a private association's membership criteria clearly infringes on
association." 3 Indeed, the Court admitted as much, stating in Rob-
erts that "[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion into
the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire." ' 4
But in turning to whether the state's interest in nondiscrimination
justified the regulation, the Court asked only whether the group's
expressive abilities would be affected, wholly ignoring any associa-
tional infringement that did not affect expression. A better account
would have acknowledged that the nondiscrimination requirement
infringed directly on members' rights of nonassociation, and would
have forced the Court to confront more directly the competing
interests at stake: when is it appropriate for the state to regulate
private association in the name of furthering equality norms? In-
stead, the Court avoided that question by ignoring all associational
rights not directly linked to expression.
The Court's prior treatment of the conflict between nondiscrim-
ination principles and the right of association is no more satisfying.
The Court has repeatedly rejected associational arguments as de-
fenses to nondiscrimination laws in the business setting, albeit
without much discussion."5 In Railway Mail Assn v Corsi, for exam-
ple, the Court upheld a New York civil rights law barring unions
from discriminating on the basis of race. It did so principally be-
cause such a result "would be a distortion of the policy manifested
in [the Fourteenth A]mendment, which was adopted to prevent
state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis
"I See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw U L
Rev 68 (1987); Douglas Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v United States Jaycees,
82 Mich L Rev 1878 (1984). George Kateb, The Value of Association, in Amy Gutmann, ed,
Freedom of Association 35 (1998); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Compelled Association: Public Standing,
Self-Respect and the Dynamics of Exclusion, in Amy Gutmann, ed, Freedom of Association 75
(1998).
14 Roberts, 468 US at 623.
'I' Hishon v King & Spalding, 467 US 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting freedom-of-association ob-
jection to application of Title VII sex discrimination prohibition to law firm); Runyon v
McCrary, 427 US 160, 175-76 (1976) (rejecting freedom-of-association objection to applica-
tion of 42 USC § 1981 prohibiting discrimination in contracting to racially discriminatory
private schools); Railway Mail Assn v Corsi, 326 US 88, 93-94 (1945) (rejecting freedom-of-
association objection to New York antidiscrimination provision as applied to labor union).
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of race or color."' 16 It also reasoned that labor unions "function
under the protection of the state," and that excluding minority
employees from the union might deprive them of all means of pro-
tection from unfair treatment because the union's bargaining terms
would apply to all employees.117 Later cases simply assert that "'the
Court... places no value on discrimination,'" and that while "'in-
vidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amend-
ment . . . it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protection.' "118.
But these rationales do not explain so much as announce a result.
The Court has never fully confronted the tension between the
nondiscrimination principle and the right of association, but has
instead sought to deny the conflict. As Herbert Wechsler noted
many years ago, nondiscrimination laws conflict with associational
rights.119 As anyone who has had a dinner party knows, the act of
associating is an act of discrimination; to choose to associate with
some is almost always a choice not to associate with others. The
right of association would mean little if the right to choose one's
associates could be overridden every time the state decides that a
set of criteria are discriminatory. Yet the norm of equality would
also mean little if all private entities were free to discriminate on
the basis of race, sex, or any other criteria. How to balance these
concerns is a difficult question, one beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, and one not fully worked out by the Court itself. My only
point is that the Court should not avoid the question by ignoring
the associational interests at stake.120
116 326 US at 94.
117 Id.
.. Runyon v McCrary, 427 US at 176 (quoting Norwood v Harrison, 413 US 455, 470 (1973)).
9 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HarvL Rev 1 (1959).
1
2
1Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts may come closer to confronting the issue,
although her answer is also not ultimately satisfactory. She insists that associational rights
are at stake, but suggests that associations organized essentially for commercial purposes are
part of the public marketplace and thus more susceptible to regulation than noncommercial
organizations. While the line between commercial and noncommercial is not an easy one
to draw, it at least seeks to identify a public-private divide. The world of commerce is an
inherently public and deeply regulated world, and government has a strong interest in en-
suring nondiscriminatory access to that world, much as it has a strong interest in ensuring
nondiscriminatory access to the vote. In both instances, that interest may justify the regula-
tion of certain private entities that play a critical role in regulating such access. See Terry
v Adams, 345 US 461 (1953) (invalidating as violation of the Fifteenth Amendment white-
only preprimary election of private Democratic club, because of role it played as step toward
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The federal government's proposed approach to associational
rights cases is even more problematic than the Court's. It would
draw a sharp dichotomy between conduct and association, main-
taining that regulations of conduct, no matter how associational,
should be subject only to lenient review, while reserving stringent
review for regulations of association per se. Thus, it has argued that
restrictions on financial contributions to political campaign candi-
dates and foreign terrorist organizations should be treated as the regu-
lation of conduct, subject to relaxed scrutiny, not the regulation of
association, subject to stringent review. On this view, the right of
association would demand stringent scrutiny only when a law ex-
pressly regulated membership or affiliation per se, leaving the govern-
ment a free hand to regulate all other associational conduct.
The Solicitor General pressed this argument before the Su-
preme Court in Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC, '2 a case
revisiting the constitutionality of campaign contribution limits. In
that case, the court of appeals struck down state campaign contri-
bution limits virtually identical to the federal contribution limits
upheld in Buckley v Valeo.'22 The Solicitor General, in an amicus
brief supporting the state statute, invited the Supreme Court to
reconsider Buckley, arguing that it had "applied an unduly stringent
standard of review" to contribution limits, and that "[d]irect con-
tributions of money to political candidates might be regarded as
a form of expressive conduct subject (under O'Brien analysis) to
significant regulation, so long as the regulation serves to advance
governmental interests unrelated to suppression of the contribu-
tor's 'message.'," 23 This argument essentially resurrects the argu-
ment accepted by the court of appeals but rejected by the Supreme
Court in Buckley, namely, that restrictions on political campaign
contributions limit conduct-the giving and spending of money-
rather than speech or association per se, and therefore should be
subject only to lenient review.12 4
general public election); Smith v Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944) (same). But it does not follow
that nondiscrimination principles are not also important in noncommercial settings, such
as private schools
121 68 USLW 4102 (US Jan 24, 2000).
122 424 US 1 (1976).
1 Brief Amicus Curiae of the United States in Nixon v Shrink Missouri Government PAC,
No 98-963 (S Ct), 1998 US Briefs (LEXIS) 963, *25 n 12.
124 See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 16-18 (discussing and rejecting court of appeals's reli-
ance on O'Brien).
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The Court in Shrink Missouri Government PAC correctly de-
clined the Solicitor General's invitation, and reaffirmed that height-
ened scrutiny applies to regulation of political campaign contribu-
tions."' As the Supreme Court correctly noted in Buckley itself,
distinctions between the expenditure of money and speech or asso-
ciation are inherently problematic, given the virtual impossibility
of speaking or associating effectively without spending money.
More importantly, however, the Buckley Court concluded that even
if one could draw such a distinction in theory, campaign finance
regulation would be subject to stringent scrutiny because the gov-
ernment's purpose in regulating campaign contributions and ex-
penditures is necessarily related to the communicative effects of
the expenditures and contributions.'26 The Court explained:
The interests served by the Act include restricting the voices
of people and interest groups who have money to spend and
reducing the overall scope of federal election campaigns. Al-
though the Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by per-
sons or groups subjected to its regulations, it is aimed in part
at equalizing the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral
outcomes by placing a ceiling on expenditures for political ex-
pression by citizens and groups. Unlike [the situation in
O'Brien], it is beyond dispute that the interest in regulating the
alleged "conduct" of giving or spending money "arises in some
measure because the communication allegedly integral to the
conduct is itself thought to be harmful."'2 7
Accordingly, the Court in Buckley applied heightened scrutiny to
the regulation of both contributions and expenditures, upholding
the former but invalidating the latter.
The decision to apply heightened scrutiny, reaffirmed in Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, recognizes that the critical question is
whether the government's regulation arises in some measure from
the regulated conduct's communicative or associational character.
This analysis sidesteps the impossible inquiry advanced by the gov-
1 68 USLW at 4104-05. The Court did suggest that contributions limits are subject to
somewhat less rigorous scrutiny than expenditure limits, but nonetheless demanded that
contribution limits be "'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest."' Id at
4105 (quoting Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 30). Moreover, even this slightly less stringent
scrutiny was justified by the fact that the regulation only placed a cap on, and did not
prohibit altogether, contributions.
"' Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 16-17, 44-45; see also 68 USLW at 4104.
2 1 Id at 17.
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ernment, which would require dividing actions into "conduct" cat-
egories on the one hand and "speech" or "association" categories
on the other, where virtually all actions are simultaneously both.
Instead, the Court's inquiry focuses not on the objective or subjec-
tive character of the action, which is almost always going to be
multifaceted, but on the government's purpose in regulating the
action. When regulation is triggered by the action's communica-
tive character, it is treated as a regulation of speech; when regula-
tion is triggered by an action's associational character, it should
be treated as a regulation of association.
On this view, lenient O'Brien scrutiny would apply to a general
tax that regulated spending or contributions across the board and
only incidentally affected spending and contributions for particular
political or associational purposes. But campaign finance regula-
tions by definition restrict spending and contributions only in asso-
ciation with a political campaign. A citizen is free to give money
to his children, his church, or his local charity without restraint,
but if he contributes money to a political candidate, the restrictions
kick in. Similarly, citizens are generally free to spend money, sub-
ject only to general sales taxes, but their expenditures are limited
when in furtherance of the election of a candidate. Such a law
regulates the "conduct" of giving or spending money only when
done in association with political candidates, and is therefore not
a regulation of the general conduct of financial contributions or
expenditures irrespective of their associational character.
The federal government makes a similar argument in defending
the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty (AEDPA) pro-
visions criminalizing material support to "foreign terrorist organi-
zations." 2 ' These provisions make it a crime, punishable by up to
ten years in prison, to provide material support to the lawfrl activi-
ties of designated "foreign terrorist organizations."12 9 Under the
law, the Secretary of State is empowered to designate as a "foreign
terrorist organization" virtually any foreign organization that has
12 Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214, §§ 301-02 (1996), codified at 8 USC § 1189 and
18 USC § 2339A.
129 "Material support or resources" is broadly defined as "currency or other financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation or identifi-
cation, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, person-
nel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials." 18
USC § 2339A(b).
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used or threatened illegal force, and it then becomes a crime to
support the group's otherwise legal activities. 30 Under this law, it
is a crime to send crayons to a day-care center or blankets to a
health care facility run by a designated group, even if the donor
can prove that he intended the crayons or blankets to be used for
lawful purposes and that they were in fact so used. The law was
designed to punish support of lawful activities, for pre-existing laws
already made it a crime to support terrorist activity by foreign ter-
rorist organizations. 3' AEDPA's proponents claimed that the law
was necessary to cut off all support to terrorist groups because
support is fungible; money that a terrorist group saves on donated
crayons could be used to purchase bombs.
The federal government has defended this statute with argu-
ments that parallel those it advanced in Shrink Missouri Government
PAC. It claims that the statute targets the conduct of giving mate-
rial support, not association with terrorist groups per se. Individu-
als are free to join the designated terrorist groups; they simply
cannot offer the group any material support. As a result, the gov-
ernment contends, lenient O'Brien scrutiny ought to apply, and
the interest in forestalling terrorism certainly justifies the limit on
associational support.132
The government's argument rests on an insupportable distinc-
tion between association and material support. It distinguishes the
many cases invalidating penalties imposed on Communist Party
membership on the ground that they involved penalties imposed
on association itself, while AEDPA permits association (i.e., mem-
130 Under 8 USC § 1189(a)(1), "[t]he Secretary is authorized to designate an organization
as a foreign terrorist organization . . . if the Secretary finds that-(a) the organization is
a foreign organization; (b) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined at [8
USC § 1182(a)(3)(B)]); and (c) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security
of United States nationals or the national security of the United States." Id. The term
"terrorist activity" is broadly defined in 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B) to include, inter alia, the
unlawful use of, or threat to use, an explosive or firearm against person or property, unless
for mere personal monetary gain. "National security" is broadly defined in 8 USC §
11 89(c)(2) to mean "national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United
States." Thus, the Secretary has broad discretion to designate any foreign group that has
used or has threatened to use force, and whose activities the Secretary deems to be contrary
to our national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests.
131 See 18 USC § 2339A (1995) (making it a crime to provide material support or re-
sources to any organization or individual for the purpose of furthering a comprehensive
list of specified terrorist crimes, such as hostage taking and the killing of foreign officials).
" Brief for the Appellees/Cross-Appellants in Humanitarian Law Project v Reno, No 98-
56062 (9th Cir pending), at 30-54.
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bership) and bans only "material support." But just as speech and
association cannot be meaningfully distinguished from expendi-
tures and contributions in the political campaign setting,'33 so asso-
ciation with and support of a political group cannot be meaning-
fully distinguished. If the right of association did not include the
right to contribute, it would be a meaningless formality. Groups
cannot survive without the concrete support of their members. As
the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he right to join together 'for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas' . . . is diluted if it does not in-
clude the right to pool money through contributions, for funds
are often essential if 'advocacy' is to be truly or optimally 'effec-
tive.'" ,134 Moreover, if laws penalizing support of particular politi-
cal groups are permissible where laws penalizing membership are
not, all of the anti-Communist statutes the Supreme Court struck
down could have been reenacted simply by rewriting them to tar-
get the payment of dues rather than membership itself. The gov-
ernment's attempt to draw this distinction exalts form over sub-
stance, and only underscores the futility of categorically dividing
association from conduct.
In 1998, a district court agreed with the government and upheld
AEDPA in major part.3 ' While acknowledging that contribution
of funds is a direct exercise of speech and association, the court
nonetheless subjected the law to lenient scrutiny under O'Brien. It
reasoned that the law was "content-neutral" because it proscribed
aid to foreign groups "not ... because the government disfavors
the political speech" they promote, but because "the Secretary has
determined that these organizations engage in terrorist activity
that threatens the 'national defense, foreign relations, or economic
interests of the United States.' ",136
But this reasoning confuses the protection of association with
the protection of speech. A law that imposes guilt by association
is not saved simply because the government disapproves of the
group for its illegal conduct rather than for its political ideas. If
133 Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 19.
Id at 65-66 (quoting NAACP v Alabama, 357 US at 460).
, Humanitarian Law Project, Inc. v Reno, 9 F Supp 2d 1176 (CD Cal 1998), appeal pend-
ing (9th Cir). The district court struck down bans on the provision of "training" and "per-
sonnel" to foreign terrorist groups as unconstitutionally vague, but upheld the remainder
of the challenged statute.
1369 F Supp 2d at 1188.
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that were the rule, the Communist Party cases would all have come
out differently, because in those cases, as noted above, the Su-
preme Court accepted Congress's findings that the Party was en-
gaged in terrorism, espionage, and other illegal conduct to the end
of overthrowing the United States by force.137 Yet the Court none-
theless applied heightened scrutiny and held that the only narrowly
tailored way to further the compelling interest of national security
was through application of the "specific intent" test. The pertinent
question where the government seeks to punish an individual is
not why did the government single out the group, but why did it
single out the individual facing the sanction. If it has done so not
for individual wrongdoing, but for the wrongdoing of those with
whom he is associated, the guilt-by-association standard applies,
and the government must prove individual specific intent.
Some restrictions on foreign-directed aid might be properly
treated as the regulation of conduct subject to at most O'Brien
scrutiny. Across-the-board currency or arms export restrictions,
for example, would no doubt be constitutional, even as applied to
a person who claimed that his export was an act of associational
support. But this is because the governmental interest in such reg-
ulation would likely be unrelated to the associational character of
the export. The same is true of restrictions on travel to particular
countries; the fact that they may incidentally affect the ability of
U.S. citizens to associate with persons or groups in the embargoed
countries does not trigger stringent scrutiny, because the law on
its face is directed at a nation, not a political association. 38
I" Act of September 23, 1950, Ch 1024, Title I, § 2, 64 Stat 987 (repealed 1993) (origi-
nally codified at 50 USC § 781).
"' See, for example, Regan v Wald, 468 US 222 (1984) (upholding restriction on travel
to Cuba); Zemel v Rusk, 381 US 1 (1965) (same). The Supreme Court has consistently
struck down travel laws that target association with foreign political organizations. Thus, in
Regan v Wald, the Court expressly distinguished two prior decisions, Aptbeker v Secretary
of State, 378 US 500 (1964), and Kent v Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958), in which it had invali-
dated decisions to deny passports to members of the Communist Party. As the Regan Court
explained, the "Secretary of State in Zemel, as here, made no effort selectively to deny
passports on the basis of political ... affiliation, but simply imposed a general ban on travel
to Cuba." Regan, 468 US at 241. In Regan and Zemel, the challenged laws were held not
to implicate the "First Amendment rights of the sort that controlled in Kent and Aptheker"
precisely because they were "across-the-board restriction[s]" not targeted at association with
a political group. 468 US at 241. By contrast, AEDPA does not impose any across-the-
board restriction, but selectively criminalizes "material support" only when done in association
with particular political groups.
As a nation, our government routinely engages in nation-to-nation diplomacy, and must
often take action specific to certain nations that limits what U.S. citizens may do. Targeting
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AEDPA, however, is not an across-the-board regulation. The
statute does not punish material support (or even arms export)
generally, but only when it is provided to particular political orga-
nizations. Thus, AEDPA's very object is the suppression of associ-
ational activity with particular groups. Indeed, the case for treating
AEDPA as an impermissible restriction on association is even
stronger than the case for treating the Federal Election Campaign
Act's contribution limits as restrictions on association. The Court
in Buckley viewed the federal campaign law, as we have seen, as
targeting association because it restricted financial contributions
only when provided in connection with a political campaign. But
AEDPA goes further and restricts contributions only when pro-
vided to particular political groups. A campaign finance law that
limited contributions only to specific groups, to be designated an-
nually by the commissioner of the FEC, would indisputably be
invalid as an unconstitutional infringement of the right of associa-
tion. AEDPA is of the same character.
Thus, a better approach to associational freedom would recog-
nize that the right exists independently of privacy and expression,
and would focus on the government's purpose in regulating. On
this view, laws like AEDPA or the Chicago loitering ordinance in
Morales, which selectively criminalize conduct only when done in
association with certain identified groups, should receive the
Court's most skeptical review. Laws like the campaign finance stat-
ute in Buckley sweep more broadly, and do not single out associa-
tion with particular disfavored groups, but nonetheless target con-
duct for its associational character, and therefore also deserve
heightened review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Few rights have garnered the encomiums that the right of
association has. The Court has called it so fundamental to the
structure of a republican government that it did not even need to
be mentioned in the Bill of Rights.139 Quoting Tocqueville, the
Court has called the right of association "almost as inalienable in
a nation does not target political association as such. But the same is not true of targeting
political organizations.
139 United States v Cruiksbank, 92 US at 552.
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its nature as the right of personal liberty."'" Without the right of
association, politics itself would be impossible. And without free-
dom of association we would not be free to forge our own iden-
tities, identities that are necessarily formed in relation to fellow
human beings. At the same time, however, few rights are as
potentially limitless as the right of association. Again because we
are social beings, virtually everything we do is in association with
someone else. The problem, then, is how to protect the right with-
out turning it into a veto power over all government regulation.
The solution the Court has adopted, at least for the moment,
is to categorically define associations as protected or unprotected,
depending on whether they further other rights, specifically the
First Amendment right of free speech or the Fifth Amendment
right of privacy.
This approach, which echoes Justice Black's ill-fated efforts to
distinguish between protected "speech" and unprotected "action,"
should be abandoned, for much the same reasons that Justice
Black's approach was rejected. It directs judges to conduct an inco-
herent inquiry, since all associations are likely expressive, and in
any event there is no meaningful yardstick for distinguishing non-
expressive from expressive association. It fails to accord with the
Court's own precedents, which have prohibited guilt by association
for reasons wholly unrelated to whether the association is expres-
sive or intimate. And most importantly, it fails to reflect the central
role that association qua association plays in our daily lives and
our constitutional structure.
I have proposed a different approach, one that draws heavily
from the Court's approach to another important but potentially
limitless right-the right of symbolic expression. In that setting,
the Court has successfully distinguished those regulations of con-
duct that should raise heightened speech concerns from those that
need not trigger skeptical review. The approach avoids the impos-
sible task of dividing symbolic speech at the threshold into pro-
tected speech and unprotected conduct, and instead looks to the
governmental purpose in regulating. If a regulation's purpose
arises from the expressive character of the conduct, it is treated as
a regulation of speech, and subjected to the same scrutiny that
"4NAACP v Claiborne Hardware, 458 US at 933 n 80 (quoting 1 Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America 203 (P. Bradley ed 1954)).
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applies to regulations of "pure speech." So, too, I have argued,
where the regulation of conduct arises from its associational char-
acter, it should be treated as a regulation of association and sub-
jected to the same stringent scrutiny that generally governs regula-
tions of "pure association."
This approach does not purport to answer all of the difficult
questions presented by official regulation of association. It seeks
only to get the inquiry off on the right foot, by identifying when
the right of association is implicated. But that at least starts us
down the road to a rational jurisprudence of association. And as
recent anti-gang and anti-terrorist initiatives demonstrate, such a
jurisprudence is sorely needed. If we are to learn from the lessons
of the McCarthy era, we need to recognize guilt by association
not only in hindsight, but at the moment that it is imposed.
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